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CURRENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS-EXTENSION OF JURISDICTION
TO STEVEDORES UNCONsTITuTIoNAL.-COngreSs sought by statute to enable long-
shoremen to maintain suits under their state Workmen's Compensation Acts by
amending the Judiciary Act to except from the state law the master and crew of
vessels. Act of June io, 1922 (42 Stat at L. 634). The State of Washington
sued to compel the defendant, an employer of stevedores working exclusively on
board ships in navigable waters, to contribute to the accident fund established by
the state Workmen's Compensation law. Held, (two judges dissenting) that the
Amendment was unconstitutional. State v. W. C. Dawson & Co. (1924, U. S.)
44 Sup. Ct 302.
The statute in the instant case was passed to avoid the result of the decision
of Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart (1919) 253 U. S. 149, 40 Sup. Ct 438.
Again the majority adhere to the much criticised doctrine of the Jensen case and
the immutable concept of "admiralty jurisdiction." See Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen (1917) 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct 6; COMMENTS (1917) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 25-5, 924; NOTES (1924) 37 HARV. L. REV. 478; COMMENTS (1924) 33
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 646, note I8.
AGENCY-INFANTS-CAPACITY TO APPOINT AN AGENT-DISAFFIRMANcE.-The
plaintiff, an infant, entrusted stock with the defendant K, her agent. K, through
the defendant brokers, sold the stock, the plaintiff ratifying the act and taking
K's note. K later became bankrupt. The infant, on becoming of age, without
notice of disaffirmance, sued K and the defendants for conversion of the stock.
The lower court held the transaction void. Held, that it was merely voidable,
and notice of disaffirmance was unnecessary, since there was nothing to pay or
tender the defendants. Casey v. Kastel (1924) 237 N. Y. 305, 142 N. E. 671.
By the orthodox view an infant's appointment of an agent is void. Trueblood
v. Trueblood (1856) 8 Ind. 195. However, the trend of modern authority is in
accord with the instant case. Benson v. Tucker (1912) 212 Mass. 6o, 98 N. E.
589; Coursolle v. Weyeraser (1897) 69 Minn. 328, 72 N. W. 697. But few of
these modern cases expressly hold notice of disaffirmance unnecessary. See
Briggs v. McCabe (1866) 27 Ind. 327.
BILLS AND NOTES-UNAUTHORIZED INDORSEMENT-COLLETING BANK'S LIABIL-
ITY To PAYEE.-The defendant bank cashed checks payable to plaintiff corpora-
tion and collected the money from the drawee banks. The secretary of the
corporation, to whom the money had been paid, had no authority to indorse
checks. The corporation sued the collecting bank for money had and received
to its use and recovered. Held, that the judgment bie affirmed. Independent Oil
Men!'s Association v. Ft. Dearborn National Bank (1924, Ill.) 311 Ill. 278, 142
N. E. 458.
The payee of a check may maintain trover against an intermediary bank for
the conversion of the check which it has cashed upon a forged or unauthorized
endorsement. Buckley V. Second National Bank (1872) 35 N. J. L. 400; Crisp
v. State Bank of Rolla (915) 32 N. D. 263, I55 N. W. 78. The instant case 
is
in accord with the recognized privilege of the payee to waive the tort 
and sue
the collecting bank in assumpsit for money had and received. Rauch v. Ft. Dear-
bors National Bank (1906) 223 Ill. 507, 79 N .E. 273; Schaap v. State National
Bank (ig8) 137 Ark. 251, 208 S. W. 309; contra: Tibby Bros. Glass Co. 
v.
Farners' Bank (igo) 22o Pa. 1, 69 Atl. 280. See (1923) 36 HARv. L. REv. 879.
CARuRIRS-LIMTATION OF AcTroN IN BILL OF LiuNG.-The defendant, a com-
mon carrier, agreed to deliver bags of sugar to the plaintiff from a 
foreign port.
The defendant mixed these bags with others and a misdelivery resulted. The
bill of lading provided that notice of a claim be given within sixty days, and
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that an action, if any, be commenced within sixty days thereafter. The defendant
negotiated for an amicable adjustment and the plaintiff failed to bring suit within
the specified period. Held, that the defendant, not engaging in interstate com-
merce, was not subject to the Interstate Commerce Act or its amendments, which
provide for a two year limitation period, but that a period of sixty days was
unreasonable. South & Central American Commercial Co. v. Panama R. R.
(923) 237 N. Y. 287, i42 N. E. 666.
In the absence of statutes, parties may agree on a reasonable limitation of
time within which action for breach of contract shall be brought. Missouri,
K. & T. Ry. v. Harriman (1912) 227 U. S. 657, 33 Sup. Ct. 397; cf. (1923)
32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 289. And ordinarily mere negotiations as to settlement
or compromise of the claims do not waive the contract limitation. Ray v. Mis-
souri, K. & T. Ry (1915) go Kan. 244, i49 Pac. 397. But the instant case
is sound in regarding the specified period as unreasonable. Compare, however,
Gooch v. Oregon Short Line Ry. (1922) 258 U. S. 22, 42 Sup. Ct. 192; (1922)
31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 887.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Ex PosT FACTO LAws-DPoR-ATi oN .The plaintiffs
were convicted of violating the Selective Draft Act. Thereafter, Congress passed
the Act of May io, i2o (4 Stat. at L. 593), making the violation of the draft
law a ground for deportation. The plaintiffs having been ordered deported under
this act, sued out writs of habeas corpus claiming that the act was an ex post
facto law. Held, that the act was not an ex post facto law. Mahler v. Eby
(i924, U. S.) 44 Sup. Ct. 283.
Ex post facto laws relate solely to criminal punishments. Calder v. Bull (1798,
U. S.) 3 Dallas, 386; Cooley, Principles of Constitutional Law (3d ed. 1898)
312; but see Field, Ex Post Facto in The Constitution (1922) 20 MICH. L. Rv.
315. The result in the instant case is in accord with previous decisions, deporta-
tion not being considered a criminal punishment. Bugajewitz v. Adams (i912)
228 U. S. 585, 33 Sup. Ct. 607; Skeffington. v. Katzeff (1922, C. C. A. 1st) 277
Fed. i29; Choy Gum v. Backus (i915, C. C. A. 9th) 223 Fed. 487.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMPEACHMENT-SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE DURING
TxrAL.-The Legislature acting under the Oklahoma state constitution, art. 8,
suspended the governor during his impeachment trial. A state statute defined an
impeachment as a "prosecution" for improper conduct while in office. Okla. Comp.
Sts. i92i, sec. 152. The lieutenant governor who by art. 6, sec. I6, of the consti-
tution took the impeached governor's place brought action to prohibit the district
court fr.om restraining his official acts. Held, that the relator was properly in
office and that the writ should issue. State, ex rel. Trapp, v. Chambers (1923,
Okla.) 220 Pac. 89o.
Impeachment, though a judicial proceeding in so far as it is conferred exclusively
upon the legislature, cannot be interfered with by the judiciary. State v. O'Driscoll
(i815, S. C. Law) 3 Brev. 526; cf. Simpson, Federal Impeachments (igi6) 64
U. PA. L. Rv. 651, 8o3; Dougherty, Limitations upon Impeachment (1913) 23
YALE LAw JOURNAL, 6o; Brown, Impeachment of the Federal Judiciary (1913) 26
HARv. L. REv. 684. A number of states have expressly provided that the governor
shall be suspended upon the initiation of impeachment proceedings. This follows
from the conception of impeachment as an accusation to be tried, and justifies the
automatic assumption of duties by the lieutenant governor. Opinion of the Court
(1872) 14 Fla. 289; Stimpson, Federal and State Constitutions of the United
States (Igo8) sec. 263. The instant case reaches the same result without a constitu-
tional provision.
CONTEMPT--"EMPLoYEEs" WITHIN SECTION 22 OF THE CLAYTON AcT-CoN-
STITUTIONALITY OF PROVISION FOR JURY TRiAL.-Section 20 of the Clayton Act,
Act of Oct. 15, 1914, (38 Stat. at L. 738) restricts the use of the injunction to
cases involving irreparable damage to property in disputes between an employer
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or employers and employees, between employees or between employees and per-
sons seeking employment. Section 21 provides that the disobedience of any
writ, rule, or decree of the United States Courts where the act forbidden is a
violation of the federal law or the law of the state in which it is committed, is
contempt of court. Section 22 provides for a trial by jury in such contempt
cases at the option of the defendant. The defendants were members of a rail-
road shopcraft union who struck in disobedience to the orders of the Railroad
Labor Board and were adjudged in contempt for failing to observe an injunction
obtained by their employers. They had been refused a jury trial in the lower
court under section 22 of the Clayton Act. Held, that by their participation in
an unlawful strike against a railroad, they ceased to be "employees" within the
meaning of section 20 of the Act and were not entitled to its benefits; and
further, that the provision for a jury trial in section 22 of the Act was uncon-
stitutional. Michaelson v. United States, ex rel. Chicago Ry. (1923, C. C. A. 7th)
291 Fed. 94o.
The fact that defendants joined an "outlaw" strike against a railroad and the
lack of power in the Railroad Labor Board to punish them for it apparently
induces this strict interpretation of the Clayton Act. To make the Act at all
effective, the term "employee" must generally include strikers. See Duplex Co.
v. Deering (1921) 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172; American Steel Foundries v.
Tri-City Trades Council (1921) 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72. If "property"
includes business a strong argument might be presented on the phase of irrep-
arable damage. See American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades Council,
supra. The ruling on the constitutionality of section 22 of the Act, though
unnecessary to the decision, is based upon the reasoning that this section deprives
the plaintiff in the injunction suit of his remedy and the court of its constitu-
tionally conferred equitable jurisdiction. U. S. Const. Art. III, sec. 2. For a
discussion of this phase of the case see In re Atchison (1922, S. D. Fla.) 284
Fed. 604; (1923) 32 YALE LAw JouRAL, 843; NoTES (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 375;
NOTES (1923) 36 HARV. L. REv. 1012. But it seems that section 2o of the Clayton
Act limiting the jurisdiction of the courts to issue injunctions is not expressly
connected with sectidns 21 and 22 which define and punish contempts.
CONTRAcTS-HIRING OF MACHINE FOR PARTICULAR USE-IMPLIED WARRANTY
OF FrrNSs-The defendant hired from the plaintiff a traveler and hoist to be
used in performing a contract which the defendant had with a third party. The
traveler and hoist broke down completely and was returned by the defendant. In
an action to recover the rental reserved under the lease, the defendant counter-
claimed by setting up a breach of warranty. Held, that a judgment for the
defendant be affirmed. Hoisting Engine Sales Co. v. Hart (1923) 237 N. Y. 30,
142 N. E. 342.
The instant case is an illustration of the principle that if one furnishes to
another for hire an article for a certain purpose, there is an implied warranty
that it shall be reasonably fit for that purpose. Famwus Players v. Salomon
(1918) 79 N. H. 12o, io6 Atl. 282; Fowler v. Lock (1872) L. P. 7 C. P. 272.
These cases apply to the hiring of goods the same principle that is applied to a
sale of goods. ,2 Williston, Contracts (192o) sec. 1O41.
CRIiINAL LAW-ROBBERY-FoRcIBLE RETAKING OF MONEY LOST IN GAmBLING.-
In a prosecution for robbery, the court instructed the jury that if a person losing
at cards voluntarily delivers the money lost to the winner's actual possession, the
winner becomes owner of the money, so that a forcible taking from his possession
may constitute robbery. The accused excepted. Held, (one judge dissenting)
that the instruction was reversible error. State v. Price (1923, Idaho) 219
Pac. 1049.
It has been held that where an article has been delivered to the possession of
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the buyer, pursuant to an illegal contract, a recapture by the seller constitutes a
trespass, though the buyer has given no consideration. Kinney v. McDermott
(1881) 55 Iowa, 674, 8 N. W. 656; Thompson v. Williams (1878) 58 N. H. 248.
And a forcible retaking of money lost in gambling may constitute robbery.
Coker v. State (1913) 71 Tex. Cr. 5o4, 16o S. W. 366. But where the winner
has cheated or committed a fraud, he has no right to possession, and a forcible
retaking does not constitute robbery. Temple v. State (i9ig) 86 Tex. Cr. 219,
215 S. W. 965; (ig2o) 6 VA. L. REv. 541. A similar result has been reached
under statutes allowing recovery of money lost in gambling. Gant v. State (19o2)
115 Ga. 205, 41 S. E. 698; Sikes v. Commonwealth (1896) 17 Ky. L. 1353, 34
S. W. 902. In the instant case'the court, apparently without the aid of a statute,
holds that no one can acquire title to property by gambling, though there has been
a physical transfer. The decision has been criticized seemingly on the ground that
it is inconsistent with cases in other jurisdictions. (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv. 768.
This view appears to be unwarranted. In the absence of Idaho precedent its
court may well shape its common law in a way calculated to discourage gaming.
That the instant holding was desirable from the social view is indicated by the
frequency of legislative enactments to analogous effect. The question of criminal
assault upon the facts is of course still open.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORcE-ANNULMENT FOR MISREPRESENTATION OF CITIZE -
sHiP.--Prior to marriage to the plaintiff, the defendant falsely represented that
he was a citizen. Because of losing her citizenship under the federal statute,
Act of Mar. 2, 1907 (34 Stat. at L. 1228) she was disqualified from further
teaching by N. Y. Laws, 1918, ch. i58, amended by Laws, 1919, ch. 12o and Laws,
1922, ch. 315. Immediately upon discovery of the misrepresentation, the plain-
tiff ceased to live and cohabit with defendant and brought action for annulment
of the marriage. Held, that the annulment should be granted. Truiano v.
Truiano (1923, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 2O N. Y. Supp. 573.
The instant case presents a further development of the tendency, particularly
in New York, to allow a greater freedom of annulment in accordance with usual
contract principles. Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo (19o3) 174 N. Y. 467, 67 N. E.
63; Libinan v. Libman (1918, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 102 Misc. 443, 169 N. Y. Supp.
oo; Kwabata v. Kwabata (1922, N. D.) 189 N. W. 237; Crouch, Annulment of
Marriage for Fraud in New York (1921) 6 CoRN. L. QUART. 401; COMMENTS
(1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 272; (1923) 33 ibid. 209; (1922) 71 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 85.
WIums-LosE SHEETs-RHETORICAL UNmTY.-An envelope was found in the
deceased's pocket containing seven unnumbered sheets of paper of varied size,
each of which made a separate and unrelated testamentary gift. There was
evidence that all the writing had been done on the same typewriter, but the
spacing and number of lines differed from page to page. Neither of the attest-
ing witnesses examined any of the sheets but the top one on which they signed,
but had seen several other sheets loosely fastened to it. From a decree directing
probate of all the sheets, the contestants appealed. Held, that the decree should
be reversed, since loose sheets to be sustained as a will must, in the absence of
other evidence of proper execution, be connected by their internal coherence and
continuity of sense. In re Maginn's Estate (1923, Pa.) i22 Atl. 264.
The requirement of rhetorical unity is a sound limitation on the settled rule
that separate sheets of paper having no physical connection may be admitted to
probate upon proof that they were intended as part of the testator's will. Matter
of Snell (igoo, Surro. Ct.) 32 Misc. 611, 67 N. Y. Supp. 581; In re Swaim's
Will (1913) 162 N. C. 213, 78 S. E. 72; (1920) 33 H. v. L. REv. 989; I Sthouler,
Wills (6th ed. 1923) sec. 391. This is analogous to incorporation by reference.
See (1924) 33 YAxT LAW JOURNAL, 335.
